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Towards a new societal security dilemma:
comprehensive analysis of actor responsibility
in intersocietal conﬂicts
ALI BILGIC
Abstract. Scholars of the societal security dilemma implicitly or explicitly aim to analyse actor
responsibility in intersocietal group confrontations. However, adherence of these approaches
to (neo-)realist theoretical assumptions of the security dilemma hinders this objective. This
article provides analytical principles upon which a new societal security dilemma can be
constructed in order to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of actor responsibility. A new
societal security dilemma framework can be built upon three principles: (1) a security dilemma
results in violence depending on how the actors themselves interpret the political structure in
which they interact with others; (2) differentiation of actors’ intentions as malign or benign is
inconsequential; what matters is how actors interpret security and which tools they choose to
adopt to achieve security; and (3) identity is not exogenous to the politics of security. Adopting
these principles requires reconceptualisation of the security dilemma. It will be argued that a
new societal security, which reﬂects the politics of security, can provide a more comprehensive,
dynamic, political, and realistic analysis of actor responsibility in societal-level confrontations.
These new principles will be illustrated through re-reading of the dissolution of Yugoslavia to
analyse actor responsibility as a sketch of the new societal security dilemma theorising.
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versity, Ankara. His research interests include critical approaches to security, normative
approaches in IR, migration, the European Union’s external relations, and Turkey’s foreign
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The conventional and widely-accepted deﬁnition of the security dilemma (endeavours
to achieve security result in more insecurity) is built upon certain theoretical assump-
tions. The ﬁrst assumption is that actors survive and interact in an anarchic political
structure characterised by uncertainty. In such a structure, each actor relies on its
own capabilities to pursue security unilaterally. Second, it is assumed that each actor
has a certain idea of security: security is a scarce resource and it can only be achieved
for the self in competition with others. Hence, security is conceptualised as an ethno-
centric value and/or commodity. Third, there is very limited opportunity (in such a
political structure where security is scarce) for an actor to develop ideas and/or com-
munication channels to understand ‘benign intentions’ of others. These theoretical
assumptions are primarily the raison d’eˆtre of the conventional security dilemma.
When scholars of the societal security dilemma adopted the conventional deﬁnition
of the security dilemma,1 these assumptions, along with the concept itself, were largely
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1 Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict’, Survival, 35:1 (1993), pp. 27–47; Stuart
Kaufman, ‘An International Theory of Inter-Ethnic War’, Review of International Studies, 22 (1996),
pp. 149–71; Erik Melander, Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma Between Ethnic Groups in Emerg-
ing Anarchy (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1999); Paul Roe, Societal Security Dilemma (London:
Routledge, 2005).
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internalised by them. This generates the central problem that this study will focus
on. Scholars belonging to this approach aim to analyse the actor responsibility in
the eruption of intersocietal or ethnic conﬂicts. However, the three (neo-)realist
theoretical assumptions of the security dilemma hinder these objectives.
This article will build analytical principles, derived from the Wendtian social con-
structivism, upon which a new societal security dilemma can be constructed in order
to conduct the analysis of actor responsibility. The central argument is that actor
responsibility in societal security dilemmas can be studied by analysing how actors
understand security, how through their ideas and actions (re)construct anarchy and
dichotomist identities/interests. This task, however, cannot be performed within the
conceptual strictness and limitations of the conventional security dilemma frame-
work. Limitations revolve around three concepts: anarchy as a determining structure,
intentions of actors vis-a`-vis others (malign and benign), and dichotomist societal
identities. The problematisation of the conventional societal security dilemma theoris-
ing will be conducted in the ﬁrst part of the article, which will be concluded by
the Wendtian critique of the conventional societal security dilemma’s analysis of the
Yugoslav civil war.
In the second part, based on the recent reconceptualisation of the security
dilemma,2 it will be discussed how the conventional societal security dilemma can
be rethought and improved to enhance its analytical power to study actor respon-
sibility. With reference to the three concepts (anarchy, intention, identity), a new
societal security dilemma framework can be built upon three principles: (1) a security
dilemma results in violence depending on how the actors themselves interpret the
political structure in which they interact with others (that is, not accepting anarchy
as given); (2) differentiation of actors’ intentions as malign or benign is inconsequen-
tial; what matters is how actors conceive security and which tools they choose to
adopt to achieve security; and (3) identity is not exogenous to the politics of security
(not ﬁxing societal identities even for the sake of analysis). It will be argued that a
new societal security dilemma adopting these principles can provide a more compre-
hensive, dynamic, political, and realistic analysis of actor responsibility in societal-
level confrontations. In the last part, the dissolution of Yugoslavia will be reread
based on the new principles of the societal security dilemma in order to show how
political actors constructed anarchy and self/other dichotomies between societal
groups in former Yugoslavia.
The three limitations of conventional societal security dilemma to study actor
responsibility
Since its conceptualisation by John Herz in 1950, the security dilemma has been
enriched, updated, and recently reconceptualised. In the last decade, while some
scholars rejected the central role that conventional security dilemmas play in post-
Cold War world politics by constructing related – but essentially different – dilemmas,3
2 Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World
Politics (Hampshire: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2008).
3 Brain Job, The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
1992); Georg Sorensen, ‘After the Security Dilemma: The Challenges of Insecurity in Weak States and
the Dilemma of Liberal Values’, Security Dialogue, 38:3 (2007), pp. 357–78.
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others continued to defend the explanatory power of the concept in relation to inter-
state confrontations and conﬂicts under the condition of anarchy.4 Between these
two poles, many scholars updated the concept through introducing new ideas ﬂour-
ished in International Relations (IR), but without challenging the state-centrism of
the conventional security dilemma.5 Among the attempts to enhance the concept
through new ideas, widely-accepted works have been those which study intersocietal
or interethnic group conﬂicts through the security dilemma.6 Their key contribution
was to replace states with societies having dichotomist identities as to the level of
analysis. However, with an exception,7 new approaches have not problematised the
central assumptions of and concepts integral to the security dilemma.
Variants of the societal security dilemma analyse ‘actor responsibility’ implicitly or
explicitly. Their analyses investigated how representatives of ethnic/religious societal
groups (heads of states, political party leaders in power) through their words and
actions contribute to the eruption of intersocietal conﬂicts. However, even in the
works which claim to study actor responsibility as an objective of their analyses,8
the analysis goes little beyond policymakers’ manipulation of ancient and recent his-
tories: actors play into the existing enmities and hostile societal identities. In contrast,
this article argues that in societal security dilemmas, political actors actively (re)con-
struct dichotomist societal identities. In order to analyse this construction process,
(dominant) political actors’ ideas of security and how their security policies construct
anarchic political structure and dichotomist identities should be addressed. In addi-
tion, how they marginalise alternative ideas and policies of security and identity will
also be included in the analytical scope. In the end, the anarchic political structure
and dichotomist societal identities serve certain political interests.
The application of the security dilemma to intersocietal group confrontations was
provoked by the intra-state unrests that emerged in some European countries in the
post-Cold War era. The ﬁrst attempt was Barry Posen’s work. According to Posen,9
the security dilemma between ethnic groups arises under the condition of anarchy-
like political structure where the demise of the central authority increases the superi-
ority of offence over defence paving a way for new windows of opportunity for ethnic
groups. He integrates the dichotomist ethnic identities as a constitutive factor in the
4 Alan Collins, The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War (Edinburgh: Keele University Press,
1997); Charles L. Glaser, ‘The Security Dilemma Revisited’, World Politics, 50:1 (1997), pp. 171–201;
Evan Braden, Montgomery, ‘Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance and the
Problem of Uncertainty’, International Security, 31:2 (2006), pp. 151–85.
5 Frank P. Harvey, ‘The Homeland Security Dilemma: Imagination, Failure, and the Escalating Costs
Perfecting Security’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 40:2 (2007), pp. 283–316; Dan Lindley,
‘Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus’, International Studies Perspec-
tives, 8:2 (2007), pp. 224–41; J. J. Suh, Producing Security Dilemma out of Uncertainty: The North Korea
Nuclear Crisis, Mario Einauidi Center for International Studies Working Paper Series, No. 8–06 (2006).
6 Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict’; Kaufman, ‘An International Theory of Inter-
Ethnic Conﬂict’; Nizar Massari, ‘The State and Dilemmas of Security’, Security Dialogue, 33 (2002),
pp. 415–27; William Rose, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict: Some New Hypothesis’,
Security Studies, 9:4 (2000), pp. 1–51; Roe, Societal Security Dilemma; Matthew Kirwin, ‘The Security
Dilemma and Conﬂict in Cote d’Ivore’, Nordic Journal of African Studies, 15:1 (2006), pp. 42–52;
Robert Nalbandov, ‘Living with Security Dilemmas: Triggers of Ethnic Conﬂicts the Case of Georgia’,
Transcience Journal, 1:1 (2010), pp. 41–52.
7 Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’,
European Journal of International Relations, 12:3 (2006), pp. 341–70.
8 Such as Roe, Societal Security Dilemma.
9 Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict’.
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dilemma, especially when historical hostilities are manipulated by the elites.10 In this
way, Posen brings actor responsibility in societal security dilemmas.
Posen’s work is the ﬁrst integration of neo-realist thinking of the security dilemma
into the study of societal level conﬂicts. By fully adopting Posen’s approach, Chaim
Kaufmann in his study of ethnic civil wars in relation to the security dilemma posits
a central position to anarchy over other factors. He argues that ‘regardless of the
origins of ethnic strife, once violence reaches the point that ethnic communities cannot
rely on the state to protect them, each community must mobilize to take responsibility
for its own security’.11 The importance of anarchy as the political structure of the
emerging security dilemmas is highlighted, and so far, not effectively challenged by
the conventional societal security dilemma theorists. For example, Stuart Kaufman’s
main contribution is his categorisation of structural and perceptual security dilemmas.12
The former refers to the security dilemma emerging when the anarchic political
structure forces actors to self-help and worst-case forecasting. In contrast, the latter
happens when the policymakers ‘fail to recognize the degree to which their security
measures threaten other states’.13
Therefore, Kaufman looks at two factors in societal security dilemmas: anarchy
(structural) and benign intentions (mainly perceptual). Like Posen, he points at the
elite responsibility to manipulate historical events that feed into dichotomist ethnic
identities. Erik Melander also strongly focuses on actors with benign intentions.14
He argues that the failure to convince others that the measures are defensive leads
to the ethnic conﬂict. Unlike C. Kaufmann, S. Kaufman and Posen, Melander con-
siders anarchy as a reason of the security dilemma to a lesser extent. Instead his focus
is on the defensive (and therefore, benign) intentions that cannot be transmitted to
others.
Paul Roe remains the sole scholar who systematically studies the security dilemma
at a societal level and conceptualises the ‘societal security dilemma’.15 Roe’s concep-
tualisation differs from the previous works in three respects. First, Roe’s categorisa-
tion of the societal security dilemmas reﬂects the centrality of the malign/benign
intentions. For Roe, tight and regular security dilemmas occur when actors have
benign intentions, while the loose security dilemmas are the products of actors with
malign intentions. Although the character of intentions is also highlighted by others,
with Roe, the type of intentions becomes a determiner of the type of societal security
dilemma.
Second, unlike previous works, the dichotomist identities-security relationship is
built upon the ‘societal security’ provided by the Copenhagen School. According to
this school, societal security refers to ‘the ability of a society to persist in its essential
character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats’.16 The ‘essential
10 Ibid., p. 31.
11 Chaim Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, International Security,
20:4 (1996), p. 147.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 151.
14 Melander, Anarchy Within.
15 Paul Roe, ‘The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conﬂict as a ‘‘Tragedy’’?’, Journal of Peace Research,
36:2 (1999), pp. 183–202; Roe, Societal Security Dilemma.
16 Ole Wæver, ‘Societal Security: the Concept’, in Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre
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character’ hereby means societal identity: its language, culture, religious, and national
characteristics. When identity is under threat (or perceived so), the society reacts.
Notwithstanding the problems discussed below, Roe does not just assume ‘different
identities lead to insecurity’, but provides a theoretical explanation for why it can
happen.
Third, Roe explicitly makes the study of the actor responsibility in intersocietal
conﬂicts as one of the main objectives of his analysis. This results in shifting the central
focus from the role of anarchy to the role of agents (such as actor responsibility). Roe
justiﬁes this theoretical shift as the following: ‘if the security dilemma is to ‘‘explain’’
conﬂict and not merely ‘‘re-describe it’’, the ﬁrst challenge, then, is to (re)formulate
the concept in such a way that it can be proﬁtably situated prior to state collapse’.17
This signiﬁcantly differentiates Roe’s conceptualisation from his predecessors.
The societal security dilemma theorising has not been widely challenged in the
literature. The most import criticism, however, comes from Shiping Tang.18 According
to Tang, in order to identify a process of spiralling as a security dilemma, three factors
must coexist: anarchy, actors with benign intentions, and power accumulation. He
criticises the works of Posen, S. Kaufman, and Roe in relation to lack of one or more
factors in their conceptualisations. Tang argues that an integrative and dynamic theory
of the security dilemma he builds explicitly shows the causal links in the process. In
his own words, the causal relations operate as follows: ‘anarchy generates uncertainty;
uncertainty leads to fear; fear then leads to power competition; power competition
activates the (dormant) security dilemma; and the activated security dilemma leads
to war through a spiral’.19
The most striking difference of Tang’s conceptualisation from others is the way he
attempts to bring identity into the conceptualisation. According to Tang’s approach,
identity can act as a ‘psychological regulator’ which regulates ‘the severity of the
security dilemma’. As a regulator, it operates somewhere between the dormant
security dilemma and the activated security dilemma. In fact, Tang himself does not
explicitly mention identity in his approach. However, he implies that fear, hatred,
and resentment are psychological regulators and ‘fear of ethnic extinction’ can be
integrated into his dynamic theory. However, he also warns the reader that this type
of fear should not be confused with fear generated by anarchy. The latter is one of
the reasons of the security dilemma; while the former is a regulator.20 Although
Tang’s approach does not develop a societal security dilemma per se, he reformulates
the security dilemma with explicit causal links from anarchy to the security dilemma
by making references to societal dynamics.
To recapitulate, the conventional societal security dilemma has been conceptualised
by recourse to invoke three central understandings by different scholars with varying
degrees. Anarchy (Posen, Kaufman’s structural security dilemma, and Tang) is generally
accepted as the political structure of the societal security dilemma. Intentions are also
essential for security dilemmas. While presence of malign and benign intentions lead
to different types of security dilemma (Melander, Roe), lack of malign intention is
17 Roe, Societal Security Dilemma, p. 39, emphasis in original.
18 Shiping Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis’, Security Studies, 18:3 (2009), pp. 587–
623; Shiping Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict: toward a dynamic and integrative
theory of ethnic conﬂict’, Review of International Studies, 37:2 (2010), pp. 511–36.
19 Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict’, p. 5.
20 Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis’, p. 597.
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also sine qua non condition for the security dilemma (Tang). Finally, identity differ-
ence has been integrated into the security dilemma either indirectly as a source of fear
(Tang’s psychological regulator) or directly as an explanatory factor for the emer-
gence of societal security dilemmas. The remainder is the problematisation of these
theoretical assertions in relation to the analysis of actor responsibility.
The problem of anarchy
Anarchy is ﬁrst used by Herz in his conceptualisation of the security dilemma.21 Simi-
larly, scholars of the societal security dilemma integrated anarchy into their analyses as
the collapse of the central authority or dissolution of empires and/or multiethnic states.
According to this line of thinking, during the periods of dissolution, an anarchy-like
political structure emerges that each actor (that is, ethnic/religious group) must take
care of itself. In the absence of central authority, societies with different identities
cannot develop the conditions of trust towards each other as different identities based
on old historical enmities feed fear and the worst-case forecasting.
In such an anarchic structure, what can be the actor’s responsibility? According
to Posen, ‘the barriers to cooperation inherent in international politics provide clues
to the problems that arise as central authority collapses in multi-ethnic empires’.22
These barriers include relative security and power calculations, the necessity of self-
help, and the worst-case forecasting. Similarly, Tang put anarchy as the primary reason
for the security dilemma.23 Stuart Kaufman, on the other hand, reversed the analysis
and argued that in the case of Yugoslavia, the deliberate policies of Milosevic (percep-
tual security dilemma) led to the structural security dilemma stemming from anarchy.24
However, for Kaufman, once the structural security dilemma is in effect, there is no
way to stop it.
The question is that whether the elite would have acted differently if the conditions
of anarchy are so determining and restrictive. Within an anarchic structure (that is,
the central authority collapsed) where each societal group is responsible for its own
security, what would be the other options? Fear, distrust, and the worst-case forecast-
ing are accepted as essentials of the political structure. Therefore, the possibility of
cooperation is already shut down. According to the societal security dilemma theoris-
ing, actors do what they must do in such a self-help system. Anarchy does not leave
room for agency, or any type of actor responsibility. As a result, actor responsibility
is reduced to the manipulation of fears in the society vis-a`-vis the other mainly for
getting political gains.
However, this thinking has been efﬁciently problematised in the discipline by
scholars belonging to different approaches. According to these approaches, anarchy is
not a timeless, monolithic, and determining structure. Its degrees and characteristics
can change. They can be matured25 and governed;26 anarchy can be transformed
21 John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 2 (1950), p. 157,
emphasis added.
22 Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict’, p. 29.
23 See also Kauffman, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’, p. 147.
24 Kaufman, ‘An International Theory of Inter-Ethnic Conﬂict’, p. 158.
25 Steve Smith, ‘Mature Anarchy, Strong States and Security’, Arms Control, c2 (1991), pp. 325–39.
26 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the Study of
Security Communities’, Ethics and International Affairs, 10 (1996), pp. 63–98.
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from Hobbesian to Lockean or Kantian; rather than a structure ‘out there’, it can be
studied as ‘what states makes of it’.27 However, under the theoretical determinacy of
(neo-)realism, all these studies have escaped from the societal security dilemma
literature. The alternative view argued in this article is that: the societal security
dilemma emerges not because the political structure is anarchy, but because actors
choose to act in a way that their actions construct an anarchic political structure
eventually. When this structure is constructed, they reconstruct, rather than trans-
form, it. This is because these political actors also have certain ideas about security
and how security can be pursued. As a result, they prioritise particular security policies
and exclude and marginalise alternative ways of acting that can promote common
security with other societies.
The problem of malign/benign intentions
The root of this problem goes back to Herbert Butterﬁeld’s security dilemma under-
standing. He argues that all wars in history are tragedies. This is because actors who
cannot be sure about benign intentions of others try to increase their power by provok-
ing a similar response from others. As a result, this spiralling leads to war between
actors who have originally benign intentions.28 Intentions have been given a central
role to study societal security dilemmas as well. Scholars, with the beneﬁt of hind-
sight, pass judgements on what decision-makers were really trying to do, whether
they were security-seekers or power-seekers, whether they really intended to harm
others or not.
However, it is difﬁcult to claim that they can agree on whether intentions of
actors are benign or malign. Putting malign or benign intentions at the centre of his
typology of tight, regular and loose societal security dilemmas, Roe cannot clearly
categorise the societal security dilemma between Krajina Serbs and Croats.29 In
addition, although Roe deﬁnes the security dilemma as ‘an essentially objectivist
concept’ through which analysts can tell the intentions of actors were benign or not
with the beneﬁt of hindsight,30 Tang’s criticism to Roe challenges this. Tang inter-
preted Franco Tudjman’s intentions differently by looking at the same practices.31
This indeterminacy and disagreement stems from the fact that what can be con-
sidered as ‘benign’ for one analyst can easily be identiﬁed as ‘malign’ by another.
This is because what threatens societal survival can be a matter of disagreement
among analysts. For example, the removal of Serbs from bureaucracies is a security-
seeking policy, therefore, a manifestation of benign intentions by Roe.32 The same
practice is deﬁned by Tang that ‘the Croats were threatening the Serbs, not only sym-
bolically but physically’.33 This is an inconsequential discussion as interpretation of
an analyst about whether a political actor has benign or malign intentions would
27 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999).
28 Herbert Butterﬁeld, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 19–21.
29 Roe, Societal Security Dilemma, pp. 96–106.
30 Ibid., p. 55.
31 Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict’, pp. 16–17.
32 Roe, Societal Security Dilemma, p. 101.
33 Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict’, p. 17.
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largely depend on which historical sources s/he uses, how s/he frames the historical
case and the analysts’ personal views about what ‘threatens’ societal identity.
This problem can be coped with shifting the analytical scope from ‘malign or
benign intentions’ to what type of security understandings actors have and what
type of tools they adopt to achieve security. This shift not only helps analysts avoid
problematic discussions about goodness or evilness of actors. It also enables them
to analyse the underlying security understandings of actors which led them to act as
‘benign security-seekers’ or ‘malign power-seekers’ or ‘expansionists’. In this way,
studying the actor responsibility in triggering intersocietal conﬂicts can be freed
from ‘malign vs. benign intentions’ discussions. After all, if there is ‘malignness’ in an
actor’s intentions (expansionism, destruction of others, etc.), it is a result of certain
ideas about security and insecurity that actor possesses.
The problem of identity-security relationship
According to the (neo-)realist understanding of the security dilemma, fear, uncertainty,
and distrust towards others are fundamental factors of anarchic political structure of
world politics. As a result, states cannot and are not willing to construct common
norms and interests or multilateral forums to build common security as in such a
self-help system because these practices put survival at risk. In this point, scholars of
the security dilemma bring a useful concept in order to replicate a similar analysis at
societal level: identity.
In the societal security dilemma literature, different and inherently dichotomist
identities are considered to be sources of fear and uncertainty between societies. The
elite (for their political purposes) manipulate this identity difference and provoke
ethnic conﬂict. Although during the early stage of the societal security dilemma
theorising (Posen and S. Kaufman), the issue of identity difference between societies
is not built upon a security theory (that is, identity is taken for granted as a security
threat), for the ﬁrst time, Roe analyses the identity-security relationship through
integrating the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory.34 His conceptual map
goes as the following: different societies have different collective identities; policy-
makers ‘securitise’ the Other as a ‘threat’ to the Self either with benign or malign
intentions; this leads to spiralling; the process results in ethnic conﬂict. The signiﬁ-
cant difference from the (early) Copenhagen School’s approach he put clearly is that
rhetoric is not enough to trigger security dilemmas, but ‘if rhetoric comes hand in
hand with harmful policies, then collective consciousness, and with it group identity,
may indeed be observed as ontologically insecure’.35
Apart from this minor twist, Roe completely adopts the Copenhagen School’s
identity conceptualisation: although it is constructed, identity can be ﬁxed (tem-
porarily) for the sake of conducting an analysis. Interestingly, Roe acknowledges
two major scholars who challenge the Copenhagen School’s identity conceptualisa-
tion. First, he presents Bill McSweeney’s ideas about how identity construction pro-
cesses are affected by competition among different political actors and interest
34 Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 46–86; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap deWilde,
Security: A New Framework of Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
35 Roe, Societal Security Dilemma, p. 63.
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groups.36 Second, Roe quotes Huysmans’ signiﬁcant criticism about the ‘objectiﬁed’
identity understanding of the Copenhagen School.37 However, without explaining
why, these criticisms are disregarded by Roe who continues with the apolitical and
objectiﬁed identity conceptualisation.
For Roe’s analytical purposes, this practice represents a controversy. At various
parts of his analysis, he clearly states that the objective of the societal security dilemma
is: (1) to bring identity into the security dilemma theorising; and (2) to study actor’s
responsibility in eruption of ethnic conﬂicts. In relation to the ﬁrst objective, Roe’s
theory is not in fact different from the previous works.38 Roe states that ‘they [iden-
tities] become objects around which security dynamics can take place’.39 Putting it at
the centre of security relations, as in previous works of Posen and Kaufman, Roe
assumes a unidirectional relationship between identity and security: different (ﬁxed,
although temporarily) identities lead to insecurity. However, rather than bringing
identity into the security dilemma theorising, this is replacing sovereignty of states
with identities of societies. As will be discussed below, the relationship between iden-
tity and ideas and policies of security can better be grasped if the relationship is
accepted as mutually constitutive.
Regarding the second objective, actor responsibility in Roe’s analysis does not go
beyond the manipulation of identity difference. However, actor responsibility cannot
be reduced to this because political actors through their ideas about security can
reconstruct dichotomist identities. In other words, McSweeney’s and Huysmans’
criticisms are important not only because the ﬁxed identity conceptualisation is
sociologically inaccurate. It is also because a ﬂuid identity understanding opens new
venues for security analysts to examine how political actors with different political
interests construct and reconstruct particular identities by marginalising others. As a
result, analysts will be able to examine why certain policymakers fail to transform
the existing dichotomies. The contrary is an apolitical analysis of identity-security rela-
tionship which assumes ‘identity’ as a ﬁxed factor exogenous to political processes:40
identity is out there to be manipulated by the elite.
So far, the three limitations of the conventional societal security dilemma
approach were discussed with reference to its understanding of anarchy, of actors’
intentions and identities. In the following section, the reading of the dissolution of
Yugoslavia by the conventional approach will be criticised based on the Wendtian
social constructivism. Therefore, the need for an alternative security dilemma approach
will be better situated on a theoretical foundation.
Wendtian critique of the conventional societal security dilemma in Yugoslavia
The scholars of conventional societal security dilemma read the dissolution of Yugo-
slavia as the following. The economic and political crises had weakened the federal
36 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity, Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
37 Jef Huysmans, ‘Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda
in Europe’, European Journal of International Relations, 4:4 (1998), pp. 479–506.
38 For his criticisms to the predecessors see Roe, ‘The Interstate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conﬂict as a
‘‘Tragedy’’?’.
39 Roe, Societal Security Dilemma, p. 47.
40 For the detailed discussion, see Pinar Bilgin, ‘Identity/Security’ in Peter J. Burgess (ed.), Handbook of
New Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 81–9.
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government of Belgrade throughout the 1980s. The ﬁrst unrest emerged in Kosovo in
1989. The leader of Serbian communists Milosevic paid a visit to the Serbian
minority in Kosovo and made his infamous ‘Greater Serbia’ speech. Kosovo and
Vojvodina were annexed by Serbia (see the third Section). Fearing of a similar inter-
vention, Slovenia shut down its borders. Islamist ideology of Alia Izetbegovic in
Bosnia and the Croatian nationalism of Franco Tudjman in Croatia were rising.
Especially, the Croatization policies of Tudjman fed fear and hatred in Serbia
towards the Croats. Meanwhile, nationalist leaders Tudjman and Milosevic were
successfully manipulating the war-time atrocities. Milosevic came to power in the
ﬁrst general elections in Serbia. As a response, other republics declared indepen-
dence. Consequently, the civil war started (see Table 1 below).
Wendt divides social actors in two elements: behaviours and properties.41 Properties
refer to actors’ identities and interests, which are in a mutually constitutive relationship
with behaviours. From the perspective of Wendtian social constructivism, the con-
ventional societal security dilemma focuses on the behaviours of actors. In other
41 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 26.
Weakening of the central authority through the 1980s
1989 Kosovo Uprising
Serbia’a annexation of autonomous regions of Kosova and Vojvodina;
Milosovic’s ‘Greater Serbia’ speech in Kosovo






Increasing hate and fear in Serbia in relation to ‘fellow Serbians’ in other republics;
increasing Serbian nationalism; the government of Milosovic
Declerations of Independence of Croatia, Slovenia and ﬁnally Bosnia-Herzegovina
1992 Yugoslavian Civil War
Table 1. 1989–1992 Societal security dilemma in former Yugoslavia
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words, the security dilemma is almost reduced to the action-reaction dynamic
between political actors acting on behalf of groups. The conventional approach
attempts to read intentions of political actors, and therefore, to explain the ethnic
conﬂict partly based on ‘benignness’ or ‘malignness’ of actors. However, as discussed
above, this has proven to be a problematic attempt in itself. Apart from intentions,
the political structure (anarchy) and properties (identities and interests) of actors are
taken for granted. As there is a limited, if any, analytical focus on how political
actors themselves thought about the dissolution process, identities, and interests of
their respective ethnic groups, the role of political actors is reduced to the manipula-
tive agents who play into the assumedly already existing identity differences.
Wendtian social constructivism enables a more comprehensive and realistic
approach to study actor responsibility in societal security dilemmas. The key is Wendt’s
conceptualisation of the mutually constitutive relationship between beliefs (ideas)
and identities/interests. Actors have beliefs about what exists exogenously. However,
according to Wendt, ‘beliefs are not merely about an external world. They also con-
stitute a certain identity and its relationship to that world, which in turn motivates
action in certain directions.’42 This is not to argue that ideas cause identities/
interests. Rather, the point is that ideas of actors contribute to the constitution of
particular identities and interests, which in turn constitute beliefs. This mutually con-
stitutive relationship results in particular behaviours. When behaviours produce
interaction with others, this interaction affects beliefs, identities, and interests of
actors. Interactions between actors construct micro-structures (for example, relation-
ship between Serbs and Croats or between Serbs and Bosnians). These microstructures
constitute a macrostructure (for example, an anarchic political structure), which affects
microstructural relations.43
Wendt’s social constructivist approach not only analyses mutually constitutive
relations (between ideas and identities/interests or between micro and macro structures)
but also enables the exploration of constructed nature of structures and identities/
interests rejecting the essentialist approaches to them. To put it simply, Wendtian
approach enables the deconstruction of the factors, which are taken for granted by
the conventional societal security dilemma. The latter’s analysis reiﬁes the properties
of actors and structures in which they interact by prioritising behaviour. This approach
‘disempowers’ actors politically as they are generally treated as automated units in
already existing structures (ethnic differences, anarchy, and so on).44
In contrast, social constructivist approach to the security dilemma directs the
analytical attention to the role of actors’ ideas about themselves, others, and political
structures under the condition of uncertainty and fear. The implications of it for the
societal security dilemma theorising are thought-provoking. When actors experience
insecurity in relation another, how do they think about themselves? How do they
position themselves in relation to another? What do they think about the political
structures? What kinds of solutions they envisage to the insecurity problem they face?
The crucial dimension for the objective of this discussion is that actors can be
studied as deliberative political agents whose ideas about (in)security of themselves
42 Ibid., p. 124.
43 Ibid., p. 150.
44 Ibid., p. 112.
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and others constitute political identities/interests, and eventually the political macro-
structure. Therefore, their responsibility can be studied in a more comprehensive
way, as their ideas partly constitute dichotomist identities and self-centric security
interests. In order to conduct this analysis, a different security dilemma framework
is needed: a security dilemma with ideational schemes, or the logics of insecurity.
Towards a new societal security dilemma to analyse actor responsibility:
setting the parameters
Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma framework provides an alternative way in
order to study the actor responsibility in intersocietal conﬂicts by rendering ideas
a prominent role. When actors make choices about how to pursue security for them-
selves under the condition of uncertainty, they act in accordance with certain idea-
tional schemes. Schemes include ideas about (in)security, the ways to pursue security,
how to identify the Self in relation to ‘threatening’ others, and about self-interests,
recalling Wendt’s words, ‘we want what we want because of how we think about
it’.45 Ideas constitute identities/interests, which inform behaviours. Microstructural
interactions then constitute the political macrostructure. In the security dilemma
theorising, Booth and Wheeler deﬁne three types of ideational schemes in terms of
three ‘logics of insecurity’.
The three logics of insecurity consist of three different understanding of security.
Each logic (and therefore each conception of security) suggests alternative ways
to deal with insecurity. The ﬁrst logic of insecurity is fatalism, which assumes that
anarchy is the political structure in which actors interact. Living in anarchic struc-
ture, actors feel Hobbesian fear towards each other46 as there is no way to be fully
sure about others’ intentions. The central assumption of fatalism is that under such
uncertainty, when an actor faces insecurity in relation to another, it should assume
and prepare itself for the worst. The actor pursues security through ethnocentric
policies.47 If the actor does not assume these ethnocentric security policies, it risks
destruction. The logic of fatalism generally reﬂects the conventional security dilemma
understanding, which inspired the societal security dilemma. However, this represents
only one choice and one possibility in the security dilemma.
The second logic of insecurity is the logic of mitigator. According to the mitigator
logic, policymakers can break the vicious cycle of security competition and war
through constructing common norms, shared values, and common interests. They
therefore build a cooperative political structure in which different units (states) can
coexist together. As a result, the political structure evolves into Lockean or even
Kantian anarchy. In other words, anarchy can be ‘matured’. If actors choose to act
in this way, an order can be forged.48 As actors interact in such a predictable struc-
ture, the insecurity in relation to others’ intentions can decrease.
45 Ibid., p. 119.
46 Butterﬁeld, History and Human Relations.
47 Ethnocentric security policies can be identiﬁed as those which egoistically aim to provide security for
the self, without giving consideration of how these policies affect others, see Ken Booth, Strategy and
Ethnocentrism (New York, Holmes and Meier, 1979), p. 5.
48 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp. 15–16.
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If actors choose to act in accordance with the fatalist logic, the security dilemma
can result in mutual tension accompanied by arms racing at best, and conﬂict at
worse. Actors choosing to act within the conﬁnes of the mitigator logic can break
the vicious cycle of competition and war. They can mitigate, but not transcend the
security dilemma. In order to transcend the security dilemma, actors have another
choice: to construct a common we-feeling through trust-building at societal level.
Actors adopting the transcender logic choose to act in a way that existing identities
and interests are redeﬁned in order to pursue common security. The fundamental
difference from the mitigator logic is that in the transcender logic, a common we-
feeling should be constructed at societal level. Trust-building at societal level is
functional to construct this common identity.49 This new conceptualisation along
the logics of insecurity provides a fresh perspective to analyse actor responsibility
in societal security dilemma processes, as the logics provide alternative ideas about
security that actors adopt.
Actor responsibility in reconstructing anarchy
Either as a cause (Posen, Tang) or as a permissive structure (Roe), anarchy is attributed
a central role by the scholars of the societal security dilemma. However, none of these
approaches problematise the taken-for-granted characteristic of anarchy: they accept
it as a reality out there that determines actors’ actions. However, this understanding
has long been challenged by various approaches including English School-inspired
approaches,50 by regime theorists,51 by feminist approaches,52 by the security com-
munity approach,53 and by social constructivist approaches.54 However, this broad
and highly relevant discussion about how actors as agents construct structures has
not been reﬂected in the societal security dilemma theorising.55
Notwithstanding their signiﬁcant differences, all these approaches reiterate that,
rather than an all-encompassing and determining structure out there, anarchy can
49 Although it is a very important component of the transcender logic, trust-building is not in the analytical
scope of this article. For how trust is conceptualised by Booth and Wheeler see The Security Dilemma,
pp. 229–45.
50 Smith, ‘Mature Anarchy’.
51 Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Demand for International Regimes’, International Organization, 36:2 (1982),
pp. 325–55; Robert Jervis, ‘Security Regimes’, International Organization, 36:2 (1982), pp. 357–78.
52 Ann Tickner, ‘You just don’t understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR Theorists’,
International Studies Quarterly, 41:4 (1997), pp. 611–32.
53 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, ‘A Framework for the Study of Security Communities’, in Emanuel
Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), The Security Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), pp. 29–65.
54 Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International Security,
23:1 (1998), pp. 171–200; C. Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and
Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Yosef
Lapid and Frederick Kratochwil, ‘Revisiting the ‘‘National’’: Toward an Identity Agenda in Neorealism,
in Y. Lapid and F. Kratochwil (eds), The Return of Culture in IR Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
1996), pp. 105–26; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; on how changes in structure in turn
affect units see Jeffrey Checkel, ‘Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’,
International Studies Quarterly, 43:1 (1999), pp. 83–114.
55 Only Roe mentioned Lapid and Kratochwil’s criticism about anarchy conception in societal security
dilemma, but he used it as a justiﬁcation to formulate a theory before ‘anarchy’ is created. However,
his approach does not analyse how actors construct and reconstruct anarchy through their actions, see
Roe, Societal Security Dilemma, p. 39.
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be reconstructed, reformed, or transformed (their answers to ‘how’ and ‘to what
extent’ questions signiﬁcantly differ) by the actors. This understanding asserts that
actors enjoy some level of agency in varying degrees. The question here is whether
actors choose to use this (limited or extended) agency to construct and reconstruct
the anarchic political structure or to transform its parts or its whole. In other words,
if scholars of the societal security dilemma conceive the political structures followed
by the dissolution of multi-ethnic states or the collapse of the central authority as
anarchy, this can be partly because dominant political actors construct and reconstruct
this anarchic political structure, which feeds into mutual fear, hostility, and distrust.
This, of course, certainly does not mean that political actors are autonomous from
structural constraints. ‘Structures obviously (always) affect people’s decisions, but
they do not determine them. They are a necessary part of an explanation of behaviour,
but they are not sufﬁcient.’56 If, as Buzan argues,57 structures and units are always
in a mutually constitutive relationship, another necessary explanatory factor in con-
structing anarchic structures is the actor’s responsibility: the choices of actors about
how to think and act.
The new security dilemma framework enables scholars to address this neglected
point. By bringing the logics of insecurity into the security dilemma, which is recon-
ceptualised as a ‘difﬁcult choice of an actor between two alternatives’ or two logics,
actor responsibility in eruption of ethnic conﬂicts gains a deeper dimension. Why did
actors act according to the fatalist logic, other than the mitigator logic or why did
they choose to adopt ethnocentric security policies instead of trust-building policies
to construct a ‘we-feeling’ between societies? Political structures are hardly mono-
lithic and oppressive to the extent that they disable all alternative ideas and policies,
as will be seen below in the case of Yugoslavia. There are always different choices
underlined by fatalism, mitigator, or transcender logics. Roe himself acknowledges
this fact in relation to Croatia in 1990s and ‘as with Croats, security requirements
were also subject to internal contestation’.58 However, this contestation between
different ideas about security and how some political actors marginalised alternatives
and fatalistically took ethnocentric policies, and therefore, reconstructed anarchy
have so far escaped from all conventional societal security dilemma approaches.
When societal conﬂicts are reanalysed through the prism provided by the new
security dilemma, actor responsibility cannot be reduced to the manipulation of
historic enmities for political purposes. Dominant political actors, by marginalising
alternative actors and their ideas, fatalistically adopt ethnocentric security ideas and
policies without considering how these policies are received by others. Through security
policies underlined by fatalism, they reconstruct the anarchic political structure. In
other words, Tudjman’s Croatia’s practices in 1992 to protect the Croatian national
identity can be generated by fears and uncertainty stemming from the anarchy-like
political structure following the dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, what is neglected
in the conventional societal security dilemma literature is how the ideas and policies
of Tudjman contributed to the reconstruction of this anarchic structure, rather than
transforming, or at least mollifying, it.
56 Booth, Theory of World Security, p. 218.
57 Barry Buzan, ‘The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered’, in Ken Booth
and Steve Smith (eds), International Relations Theory (Oxford: Polity, 1995), p. 213.
58 Roe, Societal Security Dilemma, pp. 96 and 102.
198 Ali Bilgic
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210512000095
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 31 Jan 2017 at 07:45:59, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
From the malign/benign intentions to the logics of insecurity
The analytical focus on whether actors have malign or benign intentions largely
originates from the conventional security dilemma theorising primarily structured in
the Butterﬁeldian way. This approach misleads analysts in two senses. First, ‘malign’
and ‘benign’ are analytical, albeit problematic, labels created by analysts to describe
actors’ intentions. As to the reminder, if an actor does not aim to attack another and
takes defensive measures for its own security, the intentions are described as benign.
However, if s/he takes actions to attack another, the intentions are put as ‘malign’.
The existence of ‘benign’ intentions becomes a criterion to determine what kind of
societal security dilemma the case under investigation exempliﬁes59 or even the situa-
tion can be deﬁned as a security dilemma.60 Whether an actor had malign or benign
intentions can only be known by analysts with the beneﬁt of hindsight. However,
the conventional societal security dilemma approaches are quick to accept these
analytical labels as ontological realities: as if actors really had malign or benign
intentions during the time of the crisis. However, it is highly unlikely that a political
actor thinks his/her intentions are malign even if s/he intends to wage war on another
(analytically, it must point at malign intentions) because war can serve a ‘good’
cause: self-security.61
While investing too much attention in ‘malign’ and ‘benign’ intentions, what is
neglected in the conventional thinking is the role of instrumental reason: the end
justiﬁes the means. Instrumental reason is one of the key components of the fatalist
logic, which prompts policymakers to adopt policies that assumingly increase self-
security without considering how these policies affect others negatively. In its worst
case, ‘instrumental reason turns people into cogs into genocidal machines and policies
without fully appreciating what is happening’.62 Increasing security for the society
they represent is a useful justiﬁcation mechanism for policymakers. At the end of
the day, Milosevic and Tudjman in 1992-4 were trying to increase security for their
respective societies, even if their mutual policies led to the ethnic cleansing of other
societal groups. For scholars, their intentions can be identiﬁed as malign with the
beneﬁt of hindsight. However, during the time of the crisis, were they really ‘malign’
or was instrumental rationality operational that even the most destructive ideas were
considered by actors themselves as ‘benign’? And if actors themselves identiﬁed their
intentions as ‘benign’, is it possible to talk about ‘malign’ intentions during the time
of crises? ‘Malign’ and ‘benign’ are misleading labels that analysts use to identify
intentions after the conﬂict.
Can actors be taken responsible during the time of crises for their actions if they
thought that their security policies were serving a good cause? They still can be but
59 Roe, Societal Security Dilemma and Kaufman, ‘An International Theory of Inter-Ethnic Conﬂict’.
60 Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma’.
61 The ‘malign/benign intention’ assumption can also be questioned by using approaches which study cogni-
tive mechanisms through decision-makers justify their decisions and actions, see Jervis’s ‘Cognitive
Dissonance’ idea, in Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1976), p. 406; Janis’ ‘Groupthink’ approach, see Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological
Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston: Houghton Mifﬂin, 1972). As an example,
see Dina Badie, ‘Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift toward Iraq’,
Foreign Policy Analysis, 6:4 (2010), pp. 277–96.
62 Booth, Theory of World Security, p. 254.
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not through engaging in inconsequential discussions about the malignness or benign-
ness of intentions. What must be questioned here is what actors understood from
security during the time of crises that activated instrumental reason. This leads us to
the second point.
The second point about why the focus on intentions is not helpful to determine
actor responsibility is that intentions are derived from ideas about security. Inten-
tions are important not as a cause of the societal security dilemma, as in put by
Tang, but as indicators. What they indicate is the security understandings of actors:
what does security mean for me, how to pursue security for myself, are others threat-
ening us, what kind of political structure in which I must interact with others. Fatalist,
mitigator, and transcender logics result in different intentions. For example, a policy-
maker adopting the principles of the fatalist logic tends to suppress other ethnic iden-
tities for its security; another one with the mitigator logic tends to ﬁnd alternative
ways to coexist with the other, but as separate entities.
The analytical focus with the new security dilemma is directed to actors’ concep-
tions of security: which conception or understanding an actor chooses to act on?
In this way, actor responsibility can be studied better in intersocietal conﬂicts than
inconsequential endeavours to determine whether actors had malign or benign inten-
tions, even if this labelling cannot reﬂect the reality during the time of the crisis. The
focus on security rationalities also frees the analysts from taking the beneﬁt of hind-
sight about past conﬂicts. They can also pass judgements on actor responsibility in
current societal confrontations by analysing actors’ discourses and practices. Depend-
ing on the logic of insecurity adopted, analysts can make predictions about the like-
lihood of conﬂict.
Mutually constitutive identity-security relationship
The constitutive role of political actors in eruption of intersocietal conﬂicts can be
studied in relation to identity. In order to analyse actor responsibility, identity (ethnic,
religious, or societal in general) can be approached, ﬁrst, as a linguistic construct, and
second, as a sociological construct.
In relation to the former, identities are accepted as linguistic products of actors’
narratives. Actors choose what to narrate and how to narrate about the past and
through narration, they reconstruct reality.63 Political actors can perform this in
consideration with their political interests. However, the implication of the linguistic
argument is greater than this. Through narratives, political actors do not only play
into historical enmities, but they reconstruct ‘the threatened, victimized Self ’ and
‘the threatening Other’.64 In other words, identities are not settled foundations out
there upon which actors play the game of politics, as the conventional societal security
dilemma suggest. On the contrary, political actors tell stories of the past in a particular
way that the Self-identity is constructed as opposed to the Other-identity. Hence, actor
responsibility does not lie in the manipulation of the existing identity differences, but
in constructing these identities in a dichotomist way.
63 Janice Bially Mattern, Ordering International Politics: Identitiy, Crisis and Representational Force
(London: Routledge, 2005), p. 9.
64 cf. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minnea-
polis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).
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However, identity construction processes still cannot be reduced only to linguistic
processes. McSweeney in his sociological analysis of identity-security nexus argues
that as identity is not ‘a thing’ but ‘a process of negotiation among people and interest
groups’, identity construction processes cannot be thought of autonomous from com-
petition about how the unit (state or society) can solve its insecurity problem.65 He
concludes that ‘the security problem is not there just because people have separate
identities; it may well be the case that they have separate identities because of the
security problem’.66 This argument has an important implication for the purposes
of this article: under the condition of uncertainty (such as the collapse of the central
authority) societal groups feel insecurity and as a response, they can choose to adopt
security ideas and policies that construct different identities as ‘the Others’ who can
attack anytime and anywhere. In a similar manner, when insecurity is felt, they can
also choose to deal with this by constructing a common identity with others.67 Actor
responsibility can be investigated in terms of how political actors construct dichotomist
societal identities as a response to the insecurity problem. In order to perform this
task, the scope again should be directed towards security understandings of actors.
Unfolding the dynamics of ‘co-constitution’ of identity and security paves the
way for analysing identity ‘as a source of security’.68 The new security dilemma
framework enables analysts to integrate this idea into the societal security dilemma
theorising. When actors choose to act in accordance with the principles of the fatalist
logic, their security understanding directs them to adopt ethnocentric security policies
without taking how others might be affected by these policies. These policies feed into
‘othering’ processes by constructing and reconstructing them as threats to societal self-
identity in the making. This does not preclude of course the possibility that actors
adopt the fatalist logic because they have dichotomist identities. The point here is
that the relationship between identity and conceptions about security is not unidirec-
tional, but mutually constitutive.
Even if societies are assumed to have dichotomist identities, security policies under-
lined by the mitigator logic have potential to transform this dichotomy. Actors have
important responsibilities in these processes. Take Michael Barnett’s analysis of the
1992 general elections in Israel between Yitzhak Shamir, who defended an ultrana-
tionalist Israeli identity, and Yitzhak Rabin, who campaigned for an Israeli identity
integrated with the world and conciliation with ‘enemies’. As a result of the victory
of Rabin, ‘a construction of an Israeli national identity and interests that were tied to
a peace process that involved a territorial compromise with the Palestinians’, and the
peace process was about ‘who it [Israel] was and who it was to become’.69 Through
the Oslo Process, the parties through their narratives and practices attempted to
mitigate their security dilemma by deconstructing the dichotomist identities. How-
ever, these mitigation attempts remained at state-level and could not be nestled into
the societal level, old hostilities erupted as a result of new dominant narratives and
practices.70
65 McSweeney, Security, Identity, Interests, p. 73.
66 Ibid.
67 Such as the establishment of the European Economic Community, see Ole Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security,
and Asecurity in the West European non-War Community’, in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett
(eds), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69–118.
68 Bilgin, ‘Identity/Security’, p. 81.
69 Michael Barnett, ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo’, European Journal
of International Relations, 5:1 (1999), p. 6.
70 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp. 249–51.
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The security dilemma can be transcended if a common we-identity is constructed
at societal level. The primary illustration for this is the construction of the security
community in Europe. According to Booth and Wheeler, European states have
been able to construct a common citizenship, a we-feeling among societies of Europe
in order to break the cycle of fear, distrust, and insecurity characterised the European
politics for centuries.71 Through institutionalisation of multi-level social, cultural,
and economic relations between societies, a common identity has been gradually
constructing. Wæver also points to this process. He argues that ‘there is more and
more a European ﬂavour to being French, German, and so on . . . the national self
contains a ‘‘narrative’’ with Europe as a required component’.72 These authors’ analyses
of European integration lead us to the point that identity can become a source of
security if the common identity construction process is shifted to societal level. Actor
responsibility in societal security dilemmas lies here. An analyst of the societal security
dilemma therefore, is enabled to ask the following questions: why did political actors
not choose to construct a common identity, which would be an additional layer to
ethno-religions identities? How did they opt out this choice? Which political actors
were pushed to the fringes of political spectrum? Integration of identity as a source of
security through the transcender logic enables analysts to study actor responsibility
in relation to what actors failed to do as well.
In the last part of the analysis, the discussion so far will be illustrated through re-
reading of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The dissolution is surely a long and complex
process. The aim is to illustrate the importance of new principles by operationalising
them with reference to particular moments of the dissolution.
An illustration of the new societal security dilemma: different reading of Yugoslavia to
study actor responsibility
Since its ofﬁcial inception in 1905 to 1945 Yugoslavia’s politics was characterised by
tension between different ethnic groups, massacres, and assassinations.73 The founda-
tion of Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1945 put a halt to interethnic conﬂicts. However, as the
events from 1970s onwards illustrated, the socialist regime largely failed to build trust
at societal level between individuals belonging to different ethnic groups. Insecurity
of ethnic groups in relation to others could not be dealt with effectively. The question
of history repeating itself remained in policymakers’ (and perhaps societies’) under-
standings: ‘how can we know others do not want to what they did decades ago?’
This fed insecurity of societal groups further. Policymakers of the Yugoslav republics
then were in a security dilemma: how can I interpret others’ intentions of others and
how can I respond to them?
Actor responsibility in the case of Yugoslavia primarily lies in the fact that policy-
makers chose to interpret others’ intentions and respond to them according to the
principles of the fatalist logic, rather than mitigator or transcender logics. Policy-
makers mainly assumed the worst about the intentions and adopted ethnocentric
policies, which egoistically served security of their respective societies without con-
71 Ibid., p. 196.
72 Wæver, ‘Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity’, p. 94.
73 Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum,
1994), pp. 15–45; Alexander Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multina-
tional State (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 3–60.
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sidering how these policies affected others. These policies underlined by fatalism, as
its name suggests, fatalistically assumed that the atrocities of the past can happen
again so a societal group should ethnocentrically pursue security for itself. These
fatalist policies’ primary effect was the weakening of the federal government, which
was the central authority in Yugoslavia. This alleviated uncertainty and insecurity
further. Ethno-nationalist parties in the republics strengthened their foundations in
such an uncertain political structure by providing a sense of security to electorates.
For example, during the elections in 1990, Milosovic’s party’s slogan was intriguing:
‘With us there is no uncertainty!’ This was the uncertainty, or anarchy, which they
contributed to constructing through ethnocentric policies.
If a dissolution date of Yugoslavia was to be determined, it would be the day
when the Slovenian delegation walked out from the Extraordinary Congress of the
League of Yugoslav Communists in January 1990. The on-going tension between
Slovenian and Serbian representatives in regard to political reforms, pluralism, and
the republics’ federal rights reached the climax during the meeting. With the Slovenian
delegation walked out, the League of Yugoslav Communists (renamed Communist
Party in 1952) disintegrated into the republics’ independent parties. Even after this
strong blow to Yugoslavia, the federal government remained in power for a while,
albeit with decreasing authority. Some scholars of the societal security dilemma
identiﬁed the collapse of the federal government as the birth of anarchic structure in
Yugoslavia where each ‘ethnic group’ had to compete for survival. However, what is
missing in their analyses is the fact that ‘anarchy’ did not happen in former Yugoslavia,
but was constructed by certain political actors.
Yugoslavia, as an example of socialism with liberal contours, proved to be a
successful state until the early 1970s. The economic growth in all republics (but
especially in Slovenia and Croatia), industrialisation, and increasing trade volume
with both socialist and capitalist states created a period of peace and prosperity in
the country.74 However, the appearance of Croatian and Serbian nationalist groups
in respective republics led to the formulation of 1974 Constitution. This constitution
strengthened the equality of all republics (regardless of the size of population) by
adopting the unanimity rule in federal decision-making. In spite of its beneﬁts, the
Constitution was inefﬁcient because it failed to create a supranational legal mechanism
to solve conﬂicts among republics except the ofﬁce of presidency. The ofﬁce of presi-
dency itself was projected to be replaced by ‘the collective state presidency’ following
Tito’s death.75 As a result, there was left no supranational arbiter to rebuild dialogue
and trust between republics in the case of a crisis. During the process of construction
of anarchy in Yugoslavia, the 1974 Constitution, which originally aimed to strengthen
the federal government, in fact prepared the foundation of the dissolution by investing
all power to the League of Yugoslav Communists.
Actor responsibility did not lie only in failing to envisage or propose a suprana-
tional mechanism with the fear of creating a strong presidency, but also in restraining
the already subordinated and weakened federal government’s efforts to address the
problems of Yugoslavia. The incapacitation of the federal government by the republics
to address the economic crisis during the 1980s was a useful example. During the
74 Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition (2nd
edn, Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 30–3.
75 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, pp. 72–74.
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1980s, Yugoslav republics suffered a serious economic crisis. Drastic worsening of
populations’ economic situation led to the general strikes all around country. Only
in 1987, 1,570 strikes took place with 360,000 participants.76 In March 1989, Ante
Markovic was appointed as a prime minister of the federal government. Markovic
initiated new political and economic reforms in order to control hyperinﬂation and
unemployment. However, the federal government’s efforts were continuously hindered
by republics’ policymakers. Markovic himself complained that reforms had ‘either
been stopped or slowed down’ at a regional level.77 As the Markovic administration
failed to solve the economic crisis, the support of Yugoslavians to the federal govern-
ment declined further along with increasing economic insecurity.78
The construction of anarchic political structure by weakening the federal govern-
ment by the republics had another dimension: lack of a body to initiate trust-building
between republics. One story, among many, is illustrative of this situation. In 1988,
in Kosovo which was granted full autonomy by the 1974 Constitution, Albanian
majority (around 90 per cent of the population) began riots against the Belgrade
government, which resulted in Serbian minority’s unrest. The leader of Serbia’s
League of Yugoslav Communists Milosevic made the Serbian Parliament to pass
amendments to reintegrate Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia in April 1989.79 This
act was a direct violation of the 1974 Constitution, which granted full autonomy to
both provinces. The inefﬁciency of the federal government to protect the Constitu-
tion increased fears of and distrust towards the Serbian government. Slovenian
policymakers were ‘anxious to forestall the possibility that Belgrade decision-makers
might one day wish to impose ‘‘standard solutions’’ on their republic’.80 In 1989,
following the Kosovo issue, the Slovenian Parliament passed a law stated that only
in situations when the Slovenian Parliament invites it, the federal government has a
right to intervene in Slovenia.
Relations between Serbia and Slovenia worsened more. In November 1989, Serbs
in Slovenia organised a demonstration. Slovenian government prevented the Serbs
from Serbia from attending to the demonstration by closing the border. The reaction
of Serbia was ﬁerce to terminate business links with Slovenia. As a result, the common
market between Yugoslav republics became practically ineffective.
The brief examples from the dissolution process of Yugoslavia illustrate that
political actors in Yugoslavia did not ﬁnd themselves in the anarchic political struc-
ture. Rather, through their actions and inactions, they constructed it. These actions
were informed by fatalist ideas political leaders held: ‘other ethnic groups cannot be
trusted; so we need to pursue our own security without considering how our policies
contributed others’ insecurity. Acting otherwise risks annihilation.’ As a result, the
federal government was weakened day-by-day due to self-centric security policies of
the republics. In turn, fear and distrust characterised the political relations between
republics further. The Slovenian Parliament’s above mentioned ‘preventive’ legisla-
tion pointed at how decision-makers adopted the perception that they had to survive
76 Vladimir Goati, ‘The Challenge of post-Communism’, in Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic (eds), The
Tragedy of Yugoslavia: the Failure of Democratic Transition (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), p. 5.
77 Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 70.
78 Ibid., p. 71.
79 Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, p. 105.
80 Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 63.
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in an anarchy-like structure. Ethnocentric security policies followed. In short, para-
phrasing Wendt’s words, anarchy in former Yugoslavia was what Milosevic of
Serbia, Tudjman of Croatia, and Kucan of Slovenia made of it.
In a nutshell, Yugoslavia during the 1980s was characterised largely (but not
totally) the declining federal government and economic instability. Distrust among
republics resulted in subsequent political crises (like the one discussed above) which
increased the sense of anxiety and insecurity in the country. ‘The hurried quest for
personal security and stable relationships during a period of socioeconomic turbulence
and rapid political disorientation was undoubtedly important factor contributing to
the proliferation of small ethno-national parties.’81 To put it differently, in such an
unstable political environment, ethno-national political parties claimed to provide
security to their respective ethnic groups. Their policies underlined by fatalism designed
to increase security for their societal groups as opposed to other societal groups’
security concerns. These policies continuously reconstructed self/other dichotomy
between societies. The idea that ‘homogenized ethnic community’ is the best possible
solution to the insecurity of a societal group became a commonly accepted idea. This
strengthened the dichotomist and exclusionary ethnic identities further by sub-
ordinating other individual and societal identities to the oppressive nature of ethno-
nationalism. As stated by Gallagher:
Leaders who insisted that they were able to interpret and defend the popular will of the
nation gained control. Their nationalism denied individualism and disempowered intermediate
institutions which were designed to set limits on what the state could do to citizens and,
instead, the nation came to be seen as the collective individual. Citizens hitherto deﬁned by
jobs, education, character, ideas as well as nationality, were increasingly reduced to one
dimension as the climate of insecurity turned nationalism into a state religion.82
Therefore, policies which were designed to serve security of the ethnic group were
considered ‘benign’ as the instrumental reason began to dominate.
One of the fundamental features of the fatalist logic is the idea that what happened
in the past is likely to repeat itself in the future. In parallel, the nationalist rhetoric
constructing the self/other dichotomy was partly characterised by the narrative of
victimhood (such as the one in Serbia reminding the society of atrocities in Croatia
against Serbs during World War II).83 As a way of preventing such an outcome
again, ethno-nationalist political actors promoted national homogeneity, which is
the idea that ‘statehood without minorities constituted political stability and offered
the only genuine chance for peace’.84 According to this thinking, ‘ethnic groups’ are
essentially different so separation of them based on historic/cultural differences is a
recipe for security and peace. For example, in an interview, Tudjman stated that
‘Croatians and Serbs do not only have different historic characteristics: they also
belong to different cultures. Therefore any attempt to create a unitary Yugoslavia is
doomed to fail.’85
81 Ibid., p. 106.
82 Tom Gallagher, ‘My Neighbour, My Enemy: The Manipulation of Ethnic Identity and the Origins
and Conduct of War in Yugoslavia’, David Turton (ed.), War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and
Local Violence (San Marino: University of Rochester Press, 1997), p. 70.
83 Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, p. 162.
84 Ivo Banac, ‘The Politics of National Homogeneity’, in Brad K. Blitz (ed.), War and Change in the
Balkans: Nationalism, Conﬂict and Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 30.
85 Cited in Cohen, Broken Bonds, p. 97.
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Tudjman’s words pointed at an action more than a ‘manipulation of ethnic differ-
ences’. Like Tudjman, Milosevic’s pan-Serbianism and, to a lesser extent, Bosnian
leader Izetbegovic’s Islamist narratives constructed ‘we vs. they’ dichotomy by argu-
ing for essential cultural and historical differences between societies. Security was
offered to individuals as long as they exclusively adopted their ‘essential’ ethnic iden-
tity. In contrast, through education and supporting interethnic marriages, the federal
government had been able to create a sense of citizenship, albeit a fragile one, based
on ‘Yugoslavism’ with a considerable level of popular support.86 This common identity
construction attempt was abandoned by mainstream political actors as this common
identity was doomed to collapse because individuals essentially belonged to different
ethnic groups. As a result, such as Tudjman’s support of the Turkey-Greece popula-
tion exchange in 1926 as, for him, through this exchange both states achieved internal
stability and peace between them,87 policies for ethnic homogenisation became wide-
spread. ‘Ethnic cleansing’ as a policy of security was considered as ‘benign’ since it
would assure survival of ‘the ethnic community’.
A question remains that whether political actors had choices other than adopting
the fatalist logic. One of the strengths of the new societal security dilemma con-
ceptualisation is that it enables analysts to explore alternative security ideas and
policies. In addition to choosing fatalism-driven policies, actor responsibility also
lies in not choosing and marginalising alternative political ideas. Even in dominantly
ethno-nationalist political structures, there were alternative choices underlined by
mitigator and even transcender logic. As examples of policies underlined by mitigator
logic that aims to build an order in Yugoslavia that different societies coexist, in
Serbia’s political structure, the idea of ‘Yugoslav Commonwealth’ based on a common
market and the formation of ‘Civic Alliance of Serbia’ against nationalist parties can
be considered.88 However, civil society activities and their ideas emphasised, to varying
degrees, more on common identity that could be constructed between different ethnic
groups in all parts of former Yugoslavia.89 Especially women organisations were
highly active in different Yugoslav republics.90 Women organisations in Serbia con-
tinuously called for restraint to the Milosevic administration, although political actors
chose not to hear their call.91
The point here is that in Yugoslavia, even during the time of conﬂict, there were
alternative ideas to ethnic homogenisation of exclusionary ethnic groups. This illus-
trates that identity is not necessarily a source of insecurity. If common identities, as
supported by civil society movements in Yugoslavia, are constructed, identity can
become a source of security as well (remember the federal government’s attempts to
construct Yugoslavism). However, these ideas were marginalised and pushed to the
fringes of political spectrum. Moreover, as Devic rightly argues, scholars have so
86 For surveys see ibid., p. 32.
87 Banac, ‘The Politics of National Homogeneity’, pp. 32–3.
88 Robert Thomas, Serbia under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s (London: Husty and Company, 1999),
pp. 109–17.
89 Ana Devic, ‘Anti-War Initiatives and the un-Making of Civic Identities in the Former Yugoslav Re-
publics’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 10:2 (1997), pp. 130–9.
90 Svetlana Slapsak, ‘The Use of Women and the Role of Women in the Yugoslav War’, in Inger Skjelsbeak
and Dan Smith (eds), Gender, Peace and Conﬂict (Oslo and London: PRIO and Sage, 2001), pp. 161–83.
91 Donna M. Hughes, Lepa Mladjenovic, and Zorica Mrsevic, ‘Feminist Resistance in Serbia’, European
Journal of Women’s Studies, 2:4 (1995), pp. 509–32; Florian Bieber, ‘The Serbian Opposition and Civil
Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and
Society, 17:1 (2003), pp. 73–90.
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far had little, if any, attention to the alternative ideas of civil society movements.92 In
relation to the conventional societal security dilemma literature, this results in the
discussion of politics in Yugoslavian republics as monolithic that only fatalism-
driven ideas and policies existed. In contrast, looking at alternatives enables analysts
to examine how political actors in Yugoslavia chose to act in a security dilemma.
Therefore actor responsibility can be studied more comprehensively and realistically
than performed in the conventional societal security dilemma literature.
Conclusion
This article has argued that a new societal security dilemma should examine alterna-
tive ideas about societal identity with their security implications by using the concep-
tual tools called ‘insecurity logics’. With the introduction of logics, analysts would be
enabled to study political actors’ ideas about what security means, and how security
can be pursued. Actor responsibility, it was argued, can be investigated in relation to
how actors (re)construct anarchy and dichotomist identities and also fail to adopt
alternative courses of action. Four conclusions can be derived from the discussion. The
ﬁrst one is that students of IR cannot study cases without theories and/or particular
analytical frameworks, which lead us what to study and how to study. However, this
necessity should not result in imposition of theoretical and conceptual ideas on the
cases under investigation. The conventional societal security dilemma suffers from
this type of imposition. In contrast, the logics of insecurity in conjunction with the
new security dilemma enables analysts to study actors ideas and practices without
imposing theoretical assumptions on how actors must think and act.
Three other conclusions are related to how a new societal security dilemma can
be rethought:
Synchronising the societal security dilemma with the discipline of IR: Although it was
an innovative concept once, the societal security dilemma is now well behind various
theoretical discussions in IR. This impasse hinders the concept’s explanatory and
analytical power to study intersocietal confrontations. This article has showed how
some of these discussions can be integrated into the concept, maybe through trans-
forming the concept itself. This integration can contribute to enhancing the concept’s
analytical power to discuss actor’s constitutive roles in societal conﬂicts.
Politicising the societal security dilemma: A claim to study actor responsibility cannot
be reduced to make assertions about whether actors had ‘malign’ or ‘benign’ inten-
tions. Problematic these assertions are, they also neglect the political side of the
discussion. ‘What is the political actor responsibility in inter-ethnic wars?’ is as political
a question as it is analytical. If anarchy and dichotomist identities are reconstructed,
this is because they serve particular political interests. In the construction processes,
alternative actors and their ideas were marginalised and silenced. However, what is
marginalised has not been included in the societal security dilemma. Through the
logics, these actors and their conceptions of security can also be studied.
92 Devic, ‘Anti-War Initiatives’, p. 139.
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Not only the past, but predictions about the future: One of the most important contri-
butions of a new security dilemma framework is that scholars would not have to rely
on the beneﬁt of hindsight to conduct an analysis. By focusing on security rationalities
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